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To What Surprises Do 
Hog Futures Markets Respond? 
 
 
We re-assess the effect of new information contained in the Hogs and Pigs Reports (HPR) 
focusing on the rationality of the announcements. We find that HPR preliminary numbers are 
irrational estimates of the final numbers and market expectations before the announcements are 
also irrational estimates of HPR numbers. Based on these results we modify the conventional 
measure of new information entering into the market (i.e., announcement - market expectation), 
and incorporate final estimates and the market’s best forecast into the analysis. Results show 
modest statistical differences between the conventional and modified measures of surprise; 
however some economic differences, as large as 27 cents/cwt, emerged. We also find that, as 
expected, marketings information has a larger effect on short-term price changes and breedings 
information has a larger effect on long-term price changes. 
 





Previous research demonstrates that the hog futures market responds to information in Hogs and 
Pigs Reports (HPR) announcements. However, conflicting findings by Colling and Irwin (1990), 
Carter and Galopin (1993), and Colling and Irwin (1995) on the economic value of the 
information suggest that uncertainty persists on the magnitude and importance of the reaction. 
This uncertainty is heightened by findings that announcement effects in agricultural markets 
typically are only able to explain small portions of the variability in subsequent price changes 
(Carter, 1999; Garcia and Leuthold, 2004).  Part of the ambiguity and uncertainty may be related 
to the accuracy of the measure of surprise, or new information, to which the market responds. In 
futures markets, conventional procedures examine the effect on price changes of differences 
between market expectations and the announcement. However, this can be misleading when the 
announcement does not fully reflect available information, when the market responds to actual or 
revised final values and not just its preliminary announced value, and when market expectations 
are difficult to specify. Simply put, markets may be interested in the difference between the true 
value of a variable and its own expectations which are difficult for the analyst to appropriately 
quantify. In this situation, conventional procedures are biased and can underestimate the intensity 
of the market response to new information (Orazem and Falk, 1989). 
 
We examine the response of hog futures prices to different measures of surprise resulting from 
the HPR report. In the context of the HPR report, preliminary breeding and inventory 
announcements may not be rational forecasts of the final revised figures. In a similar vein, 
market expectations which have been measured by an average expectation of private market 
analysts of changes in breeding and market inventories may be incomplete if they fail to 
characterize accurately the vector of dynamic factors affecting market consensus. Using 
preliminary breeding and market inventories from the USDA HPR quarterly report, and final 
revised breeding and market inventories from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Final Estimates 
Bulletins, we investigate whether the preliminary announcements and market expectations are   3
rational forecasts for the period 1982 to 2004. We then assess the impact of alternative measures 
of new information from the announcements on hog futures prices.  
 
 
Related Literature  
 
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of HPR releases on hog futures prices. For example, 
Miller (1979) studied the adjustments of live hog futures prices to the release of HPR farrowing 
information for the period 1970-1978. Using a partial adjustment model, he tests price responses 
to farrowing information contained in the HPR. His findings show a significant response of 
prices to new farrowing information, although the response is not instantaneous. The response of 
futures prices is slower for more distant contracts (6-7 months from delivery) than for nearby 
contracts (3-4 months). Hoffman (1980) and Hudson, Koontz, and Purcell (1984) find that hog 
futures generally react quickly to new information contained in HPRs. However, their research 
does not use market expectations, meaning that price responses could be associated with other 
sources rather than the information contained in the HPR.  
 
Colling and Irwin (1990) were the first to explicitly incorporate market expectations to assess the 
reaction of hog futures prices to the HPR. They use markets analysts’ pre-release information to 
measure market expectations and quantify the effects with a two-limit tobit model to incorporate 
the effects of exchange imposed price limits.  For the period 1981-1988, while considerable 
noise exists, hog prices quickly and efficiently reflect available information on inventories before 
the release of USDA reports, and only new information contained in the report after the release.  
Some weak evidence of a predictable price pattern after the USDA announcement was 
encountered, but profitable post-release trading strategies could not be constructed.  
 
Using a different tact, Carter and Galopin (1993) contend that the HPR does not provide new 
information. They argue that the HPR has no economic value because a trader in possession of 
information prior to the release of the report cannot make significant risk-adjusted profits. They 
conclude that the market is highly efficient and able to incorporate in futures prices the 
information in the report prior to its release. In response, Colling and Irwin (1995) demonstrate 
that Carter and Galopin’s findings are highly sensitive to the risk-discounting procedures used 
and that under a wide range of reasonable risk premiums the conclusion that HPR contains new 
information holds.  To help further clarify this controversy, Mann and Dowen (1996) tested the 
effect of information arrival from HPR on both price variability and normalized trading volume. 
They find that the HPR does indeed provide new information to the market, with the reaction 
continuing to the second day after the release for nearby and distant contracts.  
 
Several studies have also shed light on the pricing process by examining the rationality of pre-
release expectations in livestock markets. Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf (1992) find that pre-release 
information is a strong-form rational expectation of breeding and market inventories in the 
HPRs. Mann and Dowen (1997) compare informational content of government (USDA) and 
non-government (Knight-Ridder –KR– News Service) reports and conclude that KR expectations 
are unbiased and efficient estimates of USDA data.  
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The accuracy of the government livestock reports at predicting final inventory estimates has also 
been investigated.  Meyer and Lawrence (1988) show that for the period 1980-87 total market 
inventories in the HPR do not significantly differ from their predicted values. However, using an 
econometric model and time series comparisons, Blanton et al. (1985) find that USDA breeding 
inventory estimates have been overestimated. Similarly, Runkle (1991) presents strong evidence 
that two-quarter-ahead USDA announcements of sow farrowings intentions are not rational 
forecasts of actual farrowings. Later, Runkle (1992) finds that errors in USDA announcements of 
sow farrowing intentions have a predictable component, but that hog futures prices are efficient 
with respect to the farrowing announcements because they efficiently incorporate the predictable 
component prior to the government announcement of actual sow farrowings.  Mills and 
Schroeder (2004) examine the rationality of the USDA Cattle on Feed (COF) reports and 
conclude that initial estimates are biased, but the bias is economically small.  Revisions of COF 
estimates also are not random and exhibit persistence, suggesting when revisions are made 
subsequent similar types of revisions follow.  Schaefer, Myers, and Koontz (2004) also test for 
rationality of COF, and their findings suggest that the information contained in the report is 
irrational with respect to final revised numbers. Further, they conclude that not recognizing the 
preliminary nature of the USDA announcement would have given very different results about 
market efficiency and the ability to predict price movements after the release of the COF report. 
 
Hence, research suggests that the HPR contains new information which is incorporated in hog 
futures prices, but some controversy exists with regards to the magnitude and length of the 
effect, and the value of the new information.  Further, there is evidence that USDA livestock 
reports are not unbiased estimates of revised final numbers which could influence market 
reaction and its measurement.  When government announcements do not fully reflect available 
information and the market responds to the actual or revised value and not to the preliminary 
announcement, then estimates of its price effects will be downward biased and inconsistent 
because of the errors-in-variables problem (Orazem and Falk, 1989).   If this is indeed the case, 
this may help clarify the existing uncertainty about the nature of the market’s reaction to new 
information and its value.  Here, we evaluate the rationality of market and HPR announcements 
by direct comparison with USDA revised estimates, and then investigate the market’s reaction to 
alternative surprises based on conventional and modified measures that reflect the effect of 





HPR announcements are released quarterly and include total market (MK) and breeding (BR) 
inventories. The report contains information which is released to the market after the close of 
trading on the announcement day. Subsequent HPR releases include revised estimates for data 
already published. Prior to the announcement, market expectations are based on private analysts’ 
surveys which typically are released after the close of trading two days before the HPR is 
released.  
 
The conventional procedure to measure new information from the announcement entering the 
market is to use the difference between the information contained in the announcement and the 
information known by the market prior to the release. This measure is then used to assess futures   5
prices reaction to the new information in the market. However, when the HPR numbers are not 
rational estimates of actual realized values, the conventional estimator of the announcement 
effect may be biased and inconsistent. In turn, the wrong sign and significance of relevant 
parameter estimates can lead to erroneous inference regarding the effect of new information 
entering the market (Orazem and Falk, 1989). Under this scenario, the specification of the 
surprise measure needs to be reconsidered. Extending Orazem and Falk’s (1989) framework, we 
test the impact the release of the report has on prices using two traditional and two modified 




it x  be the HPR announcement estimate released at day t for BR and MK inventories, and 
,1
e
it x −  be the market expectation before the HPR announcement is released. Further, assume HPR 
estimates contain some error with respect to actual inventories and that a final revised estimate 
for day t, 
f
t i x , , is released at some future day t+n.  Based on this basic structure, several measures 
of surprise are developed.  
 
A first measure of surprise is simply the difference between the announcement and market 
expectations and is the conventional representation of information contained in the HPR that is 









it x  is the unanticipated information. However, because this information might be biased 










t i x  represents the modified conventional measure accounting for final estimates. The 
response of prices to this measure might help identify if the market is able to anticipate revisions 





it x . 
 
Under Orazem and Falk’s (1989) framework, alternative surprises are based on different linear 
projections of the relevant breeding, marketing, and expectations variables. When the market 
focuses on the announcements of inventories 
a
t i x , , the market’s rational preannouncement linear 
forecasts are the fitted values from the regression 
,0 1 , 1 1 ,
ae
it it it xx β βε − =+ +  (3) 
and the new information released to the market is,  
(3)
,, , 1 , ˆ
ua a
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where  , ˆ
a
it x  are the fitted values of  ,
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it x is the linear projection measure of surprise. 
However, if the market focuses instead on the final revised estimate, then the market’s 
preannouncement linear forecast are the fitted values from   6
'''
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After an announcement, the market will update its information to include ,
a
it x , so that the market’s 
optimal forecast of  ,
f
it x are the fitted values from 
'' '' ''
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 In this case new market information is, 
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it x  is the linear 
projection—final measure of surprise. When preliminary announcements are rational, then 
equation (3.1) provides an appropriate representation of the surprise. However, if government 
preliminary announcements are biased estimates of final inventories, fitted values of (4) and 







Breeding and market inventories are taken from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports from 1982 to 
2004. The reports are the result of surveys to hog producers taken by USDA and are released 
quarterly in March, June, September, and December after the close of trading. Inventories used 
in this study are totals of major states.
2   
 
Actual breeding and market inventories are taken from the USDA Hogs and Pigs Final 
Estimates Bulletins, which are published approximately every five years. Final estimates differ 
from the above current estimates in that they make use of additional information including the 
Census of Agriculture, slaughter data, shipment records, imports, and exports. The final 
estimates inventories were matched with their corresponding current estimates so that current 
and actual numbers refer to the same states.  
 
Market expectations are an average of about fifteen private market analysts expectations reported 
as changes in breeding and market inventories from year-ago levels. The analysts’ expectations 
are released after the close of trading two days before the USDA report is released.  
 
Closing hog futures prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange were collected on days one 
though four after the report release. Two time-horizons were defined in order to capture 
differences between breeding and market inventory holders. Distant futures prices are expected 
to react relatively more to breeding inventory announcements because breeding inventory 
impacts take a longer time to affect market supplies. Near futures contracts, in contrast, are 
expected to react to market inventory announcements because this category takes a shorter 
period to enter the market. The near and distant horizons were defined, respectively, as those 
contracts expiring 2-3 months and 7-8 months after the day of the report release.
3 Hog futures 
contracts underlying commodity changed from live to lean hogs in 1996. In order to develop a 





Rationality means that the information released at time t equals its expected value at time t+n 
given all the information available at time t. For instance, the rationality condition for the 
information contained in the HPR’s breeding (BR) and marketing (MK) inventories is, 
( ) ,,
af
it it t xE x φ =    (5) 
where φt is the set of information available on day t and implies that the estimates for BR and MK 
are unbiased and efficient with respect to the final revised numbers. The unbiasedness condition 
is tested with the following equation, 
,0 1 ,,
fa
it it it x xu αα =+ +. (6) 
For the market expectations ( ,1
e
it x − ), we test unbiasedness with respect to both the final estimates 
and announcements: 
'' '
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where unbiasedness implies α0 = 0 and α1 = 1. The tests are performed on both estimates 
because we are uncertain whether market expectations focus on announcements or final revised 
estimates.  The efficiency test is a test for the presence of autocorrelation in the error terms of the 
USDA estimates and market expectations ((6) – (6.2)).  A Breusch-Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation with four lags to reflect the quarterly nature of the data is used. 
 
Tests for rationality show that both HPR and market analysts estimates of breeding and market 
inventories are biased and inefficient with respect to final estimates (Table 1). The evidence is 
less strong for HPR market inventories. Also, market analysts provide biased estimates with 
respect to HPR announcements. The evidence of bias is strong for both breeding and market 
inventories and coincides with Runkle’s (1992) findings for sow farrowing intentions, but 
contrasts with Collin and Irwin (1990) and Colling, Irwinl and Zulauf (1992). However, analysts’ 
expectations appear to be efficient with respect to the HPR for marketing inventories which is 
more consistent with previous research. 
 
 
Market Reaction to New Information 
 
The specification of the model to test the effect of the surprises on futures prices relies on 
institutional features of the futures markets. Hog futures contracts are subject to daily price limits 
of $2 per hundredweight from the previous day’s closing price. When price hits that limit, trades 
may still take place at that price, but the free market equilibrium price is no longer observable.  
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Table 2 shows the number of days that prices hit the limit during the sample. Approximately 
40% of the prices in the sample are price limits for the first day after the announcement which 
might have important consequences in estimation and inference if not taken into account 
properly. Price limits truncate the distribution of price changes and make prices less variable. 
Therefore, deviations of prices from their mean values would be harder to detect and tests are 
biased towards non-rejection of zero coefficients. Price limits may also induce serial correlation, 
which would lead to the conclusion that the market is inefficient because prices do not 
incorporate all the available information (Kodres, 1993). In order to overcome these problems 
and estimate price reactions in the presence of price limits, a two-limit tobit model is used in 
which prices are truncated on two sides but are allowed to vary freely between the two limits.  
 
The tobit model is estimated for one as well as for several days after the USDA release. Tracking 
price response to new information over time is significant as an indication of the speed of market 
reaction. A significant price response on the first day after the announcement would indicate that 
prices react quickly to new information, whereas significant price responses on subsequent days 
only would indicate the degree of delay in prices to incorporating new information. The effect of 
one-day price changes beyond the first day after the announcement cannot be directly tested 
using this model because price limits appear in a sequence after the announcement day, and a 
limit price following  a limit price would yield biased parameter estimates (Colling and Irwin, 
1990). Hence, the response of prices in subsequent days after the announcement is investigated 
by cumulating price differences for each day with respect to the announcement day. Because 
prices are permitted to move by $2 per day, the effective cumulative two-, three- and four-day 
price limit is $4, $6 and $8 respectively. The two-limit tobit price response model is, 
  Δkpt* =  0
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where Δkpt* are the latent (sometimes unobserved) equilibrium futures prices in kth difference 
form, Δkpt are the observed futures prices in kth difference form (Δkpt = pt,k=k – pt,k=0, k = 1,…, 4 





it x  is the unanticipated information (i.e. measure of surprise to the market), j = 
1, …, 4 are four measures of surprise defined by (1), (2), (3.1), and (4.2), 
j
i δ are estimated 
coefficients, UP and LL are the upper and lower price limits respectively (UP is 2, 4, 6 and 8 for 
days 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively, LL is -2, -4, -6 and -8 for days 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively).  
 
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the estimates in (7) are biased and inconsistent (Maddala 
and Nelson 1975; Hurd 1979). Further, Colling and Irwin (1990) point out that heteroscedasticity 
has been found in futures price changes and therefore some corrective estimation may be 
necessary. Hence, we specify a heteroscedastic tobit model and then conduct a likelihood ratio 
test (LR) to assess if the difference in the log likelihood between (7) and this model is 
significantly different from zero. In the heteroscedastic tobit model the error term is distributed 
as in (8) and error variance term is assumed to be explained by the independent variables of the 
model.  Specifically,   9
et ~ N(0, 
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LR = -2(lnLr – lnL) ~ 
2
2 χ ,  
where lnLr is the log likelihood of the restricted model (7) and lnL is the log likelihood of the 
heteroscedastic model represented by (8) and (8.1). LR is asymptotically distributed as χ
2 with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions (i.e. 2, ζBR = 0 and ζMK = 0).
4 
 
Hypothesis testing is performed using likelihood-ratio tests for the parameter estimates. The null 
hypothesis for the announcement effect is that any of the slope coefficients, δBR or δMK, is equal 
to zero. If at least one of the independent variables (breeding or market inventory) turns out to be 
significantly different from zero, then the information in the USDA announcement not only new 
to the market but is also causing a reaction in prices. 
 
Table 3 presents parameter estimates for the short-run (2-3 months) version of equation (7) and 




it x ,  j=1…4. To help with interpretation of the effect of 
information on prices, we also estimate the same structure in natural logarithm differences using 
OLS, which permits the effects to be expressed as proportional changes (Greene, 1993).  To 
reflect the censoring the OLS coefficients are scaled by 1/Tc where Tc is the number of censored 
observations. The results, for the short-run (Table 4) and long-run (Table 5) horizons can be 
interpreted directly as the relationship between percentage price changes in prices and percentage 
changes in inventories. For example, a coefficient of -0.6 would indicate that for a 1% increase 
in the unexpected inventories, prices will decrease by 0.6%.
5  
 
Consistent with the literature (Carter, 1999), the findings suggest that the ability of the surprises 
to explain price changes is relatively small, but several patterns exist. The McFadden and the 
OLS R
2s decrease gradually from day 1 to day 4 as one would expect due to additional 
information entering the market over time. Across surprise measures, these statistics are 
marginally higher for the linear projection measures. Similarly, the statistical significance of the 
estimates is higher for these two surprise measures. With regards to heteroscedasticity, the 
problem only emerges in day 3 and 4 with the linear projection model.  Because of the modest 
size of the test statistics and the similarity of the coefficient to previous day’s estimates, we 
simply provide the MLE coefficients. 
 
A comparison of the coefficients across cumulative price changes provides important 
information about the reaction of prices. For example, an increase of the slope coefficients δi in 
absolute value when k, the number of days, increases would indicate immediate under-reaction 
of prices to new inventory information. The effects of breeding and marketing information on 
price changes differ over time. For the near contracts, somewhat unexpectedly, on day 1 
breeding inventories have a larger effect on prices than marketings for all surprises except for the 
conventional-final measure where breedings never enter the relationship in a statistically 
meaningful manner. Following day 1, the magnitude of the breedings effect appears to gradually 
decay, and marketings have a larger and increasing effect through day 3 on prices. The relative 
importance of marketing and breeding inventories on price changes is consistent with Colling 
and Irwin’s (1990) findings, but the pattern of decay of the breedings effect and the increase of   10
the marketings effect differs from their rather stable coefficients over the four day period. For the 
distant contracts, breeding inventories have large and statistically significant effects on prices for 
all days following the announcement, which seem to decline modestly regardless of the surprise 
measure. In contrast, the marketing inventory coefficients are small and never appear 
significantly at any conventional statistical level.
6 Overall, the pattern of price changes over time 
provides only modest evidence to support a contention that the hog market over- or under-reacts 
to new information in the HPR.  
 
While statistically there appears to be little to separate the surprise effects, economic responses 
differ across surprise measures.  Linear projection surprises identify generally larger market 
price responses than both conventional surprises. For example, on day 3 the estimate of the 
marketing inventory effect on prices using the conventional surprise is -0.66 while the estimate 
using the linear projection-final surprise is -1.08 (Table 4). Using a representative price of 
$65/cwt., the linear projection-final surprise would indicate a 27 cent/cwt larger effect on prices, 
due to from the price and the difference in coefficients (-1.08 and -0.66).  The larger responses 
and higher statistical coherence identified earlier may reflect the ability of linear projection 
procedures to provide a more appropriate measure of surprise, allowing for a more accurate, less 
noisy measurement of the effect of new information. 
 
Larger response coefficients for the linear projection-final surprise compared to the linear 
projection surprise provide only modest evidence that Orazem and Falk’s framework, which 
highlights the importance of market participants’ interest in the final revisions, may be slightly 
more consistent with the structure of market information. Despite this modest difference, the 
overall similarly in results for both linear projection measures makes it difficult to argue that 
they are not the effectively same. In Orazem and Falk’s framework, these two surprises provide 
similar results when the announcements are rational forecasts of the final numbers. In light of the 
findings in Table 1 which reject rationality, the models also provide similar reflections of the 




Conclusions and Implications 
 
The effect of the USDA Hogs and Pigs Report on prices is complex because the report might not 
provide new information to the market or might provide irrational estimates of subsequent 
outcomes and still affect prices. Here we evaluate the impact of the HPR on hog prices using 
four different surprise measures: the conventional method (announcement minus market 
expectations), a modified conventional method (final minus market expectations), the linear 
projection of the conventional method (error from the regression of announcements on market 
expectations), and a linear projection method that allows for revisions. 
 
We find that HPR announcements are irrational estimates of final estimates and market 
expectations are also irrational estimates of HPR announcements. These findings are consistent 
with the tenor of Runkle’s (1991) results suggesting that USDA farrowing intention estimates are 
biased. However, they differ from Collin and Irwin’s (1990) and Colling, Irwin, and Zulauf 
(1992) rationality results. Modest statistical differences between the conventional and linear   11
projection measures exist. The linear projection measures which can reduce the effect of noise on 
the estimate appear slightly more coherent with the data and provide modestly larger effects of 
changes in information on prices. Economic differences also exist between the conventional and 
linear projection measures, with differences in price response as large as 27 cents/cwt. emerging 
when comparing coefficients from the conventional measure of surprise to the linear projection 
measure that accounts for final estimates. Regardless of the procedure used, however, marketing 
inventory information has a larger and more consistent effect on near futures price changes than 
breeding inventory information, which has a larger effect on distant price changes. These 
findings are consistent with Colling and Irwin (1990). In contrast to Colling and Irwin (1990), 
we find some modest evidence of under-reaction to marketing inventories in near contracts, and 
over-reaction to breeding inventories in distant contracts. Finally, the rather small economic and 
statistical differences between both linear projection measures suggest that when similar biases 
in expectations and announcements relative to final estimates exist, the price effects are similar 
and little is gained by focusing on final revised numbers rather than announcement effects. 
 
Several points emerge from the analysis. First, while irrationality exists, HPR reports continue to 
demonstrate that they provide information to the market regardless of the form that is used to 
measure the effect. While some differences arise, the overall message is quite robust and 
consistent with the past research that asserts HPR provides new information to the market.  
Second, the source of the irrationality in forecasting final and announced estimates is not clear, 
but because it emerges regardless of supply variable examined it makes sense to regard a factor 
such as structural or technological change in the hog industry as a likely source.  If so, this would 
argue for the importance of allocating resources to develop a better understanding of how 
structural or technical change directly affects subsequent supplies.  Such information might 
permit market analysts to generate better assessment of subsequent announcements and final 
estimates, and facilitate a more effective market.  Finally, while we find new information does 
indeed explain changes in prices, consistent with Carter (1999) and Garcia and Luethold (2004) 
the degree of explanatory power is relatively small. This limited ability, even when we allow for 
different forms of surprise and market expectations, in an almost quasi-experimental market 
context remains a puzzle.  On a positive note, this may be directing us to other types data and 
analyses, such as the investigation intra-day prices effects following announcements, as research 
strategies to better understand the effects of new information on market behavior and 
performance.   
   12
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Endnotes 
1 Alternative specifications for (4.1) using lagged values of market expectations and HPR 
announcements to allow for a more comprehensive specification of current market expectations 
were examined. Using standard rationality tests described in the text and statistical criteria, none 
performed better than (4.1). These findings for alternative market expectations are available from 
the authors. 
 
2 The USDA definition of major states has changed because some states have experienced a great 
expansion of hog production, while others have become less important in the hog industry. The 
data set is composed of 10 states during the period 1982:2-1996:1 and 17 states during the period 
1996:2-2000:4. Using a similar dataset but for the period 1981:9-1988:6, Colling and Irwin 
(1990) found no bias in the whole period data when compared to a subset restricted to have the 
same number of states. 
 
3 Time horizons are not exactly defined because hog futures contracts do not exist for every 
month of the year. 
 
4 The model for 
2




tB R B R t M K M K t xx σσ ζ ζ =+ + ) and squared models (i.e., 
22 ' ' 2
,, (1 ( ) )
uu
t BR BR t MK MK t xx σσ ζ ζ =+ + . We 
choose the appropriate variance model based on log likelihood, AIC, and BIC measures. 
 
5 Estimation of the Tobit model using natural logarithm differences is problematic because the 
upper and lower limits will vary with the level of the changes. 
 
6 For brevity, the long-run tobit response coefficients are not reported, but follow a similar 
pattern to the results discussed in the text. The results are available from the authors. 
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Table 1. Rationality Tests of USDA Hogs and Pigs Report Announcements and Market 
Expectations, 1982-2004. 
 
Variable Eq.  Coefficients   Adj.  Unbiasedness test  Efficiency test 
Dep.  Ind.  α0  α1  R
2 F-stat p-value χ
2-stat p-value 
Breeding inventories              
,
f
BRt x   ,
a









BRt x   ,1
e









BRt x   ,1
e




0.86 10.24  <0.00  5.180 
(lag 1) 
0.02 
Market inventories                
,
f
MKt x   ,
a









MKt x   ,1
e









MKt x   ,1
e










it x  is the HPR announcement,  ,1
e
it x − is the market expectations, and  ,
f
it x  is the final estimate 
for i = breeding (BR) and marketing (MK) inventories. Standard errors are in parentheses under 
the estimated coefficients. The joint null hypothesis for the unbiasedness test is α0 = 0 and α1 = 
1. The efficiency test is the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation where the most 
significant lag from 1 to 4 is reported. 
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Table 2. Number of Censored Hog Futures Price Observations Following  
USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports, 1982-2004.  
 
  Day 1  Day 2  Day 3  Day 4 
Short time-horizon       
   # price limit days  26  8  2  0 
   Percentage        35%    11%     3%     0% 
Long time-horizon       
   # price limit days  30  7  2  0 
   Percentage      40%     9%     3%     0% 
 
Note: # price limit days is the number of days when prices hit the price limit,  
and Percentage is the proportion of those days for the sample. The total number  
of observations at each horizon is T=75. Days 1 to 4 are the first four trading  
days after the USDA announcement.   17
Table 3. Hog Futures Price Response to the Release of USDA Hogs and  
Pigs Reports for Near Contracts, 1982-2004.  
 
 1-day** 2-day** 3-day** 4-day** 
Conventional    
1



























MF R   0.11**** 0.08**** 0.06**** 0.06**** 
LR test  4.79**** 3.42**** 2.08**** 3.21**** 
Conventional—final    
2



























MF R   0.11**** 0.07**** 0.06**** 0.07**** 
LR test  5.10**** 5.00**** 6.51**** 8.67**** 
Linear projection   
3
0 δ   2.4545*** 
(0.8606) **  
3.1634***  
(0.9488) **  
3.4342***  
(0.9716) **  
2.8645****  
(0.9904) **  
3
BR δ   -0.0062*** 
(0.0022) **  
-0.0047****  
(0.0024) **  
-0.0044***  
(0.0026) **  
-0.0047***  
(0.0026) **  
3
MK δ   -0.0010*** 
(0.0004) **  
-0.0014***  
(0.0004) * *  
 -0.0015***  
(0.0005) **  
-0.0012****  
(0.0005) **  
2
MF R   0.12**** 0.10**** 0.09**** 0.07**** 
LR test  3.12**** <0.00**** <0.00**** <0.00**** 
Linear projection—final      
4
0 δ   0.3018*** 
(0.2139) **  
0.2432***
(0.2318) **  
0.2156**
(0.2483) *  
0.2704*** 
(0.2545) **  
4
BR δ   -0.0077*** 
(0.0028) * *  
-0.0071***
(0.0030) **  
-0.0055***
(0.0032) *  
-0.0058*** 
(0.0033) **  
4
MK δ   -0.0012*** 
(0.0005) **  
-0.0016***
(0.0005) **  
-0.0018***
(0.0005) *  
-0.0014*** 
(0.0005) **  
2
MF R   0.12**** 0.10**** 0.09**** 0.07**** 
LR test  2.14**** 1.59**** 1.73**** 0.61**** 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficients. The level of  
significance is indicated at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
2
MF R  is the  
McFadden’s R
2 which compares the likelihood for the model with intercept only  
to the likelihood for the model with the predictors (
2
MF R  = 1–lnL(Mfull)/lnL(Mint)).   18
 
Table 4. Proportional Effect of Percentage Surprises on Percentage Hog Futures Price 
Changes for Near Contracts to the Release of USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports,  
1982-2004. 
 
 Surprise     1-day** 2-day** 3-day** 4-day** 
Conventional  BR  -0.54 -0.46 -0.36  -0.41 
   MK  -0.38 -0.57 -0.66  -0.56 
  R
2   0.26   0.25   0.21   0.21 
Conventional—final   BR  -0.19  -0.08   0.05   0.01 
   MK  -0.52 -0.68 -0.83  -0.83 
  R
2   0.21   0.20   0.20   0.24 
Linear projection  BR  -0.55 -0.55 -0.48  -0.48 
   MK  -0.42 -0.56 -0.61  -0.55 
  R
2   0.26   0.28   0.23   0.22 
Linear projection—final  BR       -0.65  -0.53  -0.38  -0.46 
   MK  -0.54 -0.90 -1.08  -0.87 
 R
2   0.27   0.31   0.28   0.25 
 
Note: BR is breeding inventories, and MK is marketing inventories. The surprises  
are defined in the text by (1), (2), (3.1), and (4.2). The coefficients are OLS estimates 
in natural logarithms scaled by 1/Tc where Tc is the number of censored observations.  
The OLS model is Δkpt =  0






it x + 
j
t e , i= {BR, MK}, j = 1, …, 4 are the  
surprise measures.   19
 
Table 5. Proportional Effect of Percentage Surprises on Percentage Hog  
Futures Price Changes for Distant Contracts to the Release of USDA  
Hogs and Pigs Reports, 1982-2004. 
 
 Surprise     1-day** 2-day** 3-day** 4-day**
Conventional  BR -0.98  -0.77  -0.77  -0.78 
   MK   0.10  -0.14  -0.23  -0.24 
 R
2   0.26   0.24   0.25   0.22 
Conventional—final   BR -0.53  -0.38  -0.37  -0.35 
   MK  -0.29  -0.42  -0.52  -0.61 
 R
2   0.21   0.22   0.24   0.24 
Linear projection  BR -1.05  -0.88  -0.90  -0.89 
   MK   0.05  -0.15  -0.21  -0.24 
 R
2   0.30   0.29   0.30   0.26 
Linear projection—final  BR -1.28  -0.97  -0.96  -0.96 
   MK   0.01  -0.39  -0.53  -0.52 
 R
2   0.30   0.30   0.32   0.27 
 
Note: BR is breeding inventories, and MK is marketing inventories. The surprises  
are defined in the text by (1), (2), (3.1), and (4.2) respectively. The coefficients are  
OLS estimates in natural logarithms scaled by 1/Tc where Tc is the number of censored 
observations.  The OLS model is Δkpt =  0






it x + 
j
t e , i= {BR, MK}, j = 1, …, 4  
are the surprise measures. 
 
 